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Implications for the U.S. of Anglo-French Defence Cooperation 
 
 
 
The paper analyzes, from a predominantly UK perspective, the implications 
for the U.S. of the November 2, 2010 Anglo-French Defence Co-Operation 
Treaty.  The current pressures on British and French defence budgets were 
the primary driving force behind this cooperative effort.  London and Paris 
have made steps toward improving joint efforts in a number of areas, with 
defence acquisition and industrial cooperation  being prominent.  In the UK, 
there appears to be strong political support at the highest levels, which has 
permeated to lower levels in the bureaucracy while UK defence industry 
appears to be cautiously optimistic about future business opportunities.  
 
The impact on the U.S. of enhanced Anglo-French cooperation would appear 
to be largely favourable for Washington.  Rather than providing a basis for 
weakened UK attention to the U.S., as feared by some, the efforts by London 
and Paris will potentially generate greater national military capability from 
scarce resources, and could serve as a vehicle for broader European efforts 
to enhance their defence capabilities.  While multinational European military 
development projects are viewed with scepticism in the UK, the Anglo-French 
arrangement could strengthen the prospects for bilateral projects in which 
other European states may elect to participate.     
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 Implications for the U.S. of Anglo-French Defence Cooperation 
 
From the UK TV series "Yes Minister", an exchange between senior civil 
servant Sir Humphrey Appleby and Minister James Hacker on fallout shelters: 
 
Appleby: Well, you have the weapons; you must have the shelters. 
Hacker: I sometimes wonder why we need the weapons. 
Appleby: Minister! You're not a unilateralist? 
Hacker: I sometimes wonder, you know 
Appleby: Well, then, you must resign from the government! 
Hacker:  Ah, no, no, no, no, no.  I'm not that unilateralist! 
  Anyway, the Americans will always protect us from the  
  Russians, won't they? 
Appleby: Russians?  Who's talking about the Russians? 
Hacker: Well, the independent deterrent. 
Appleby: It's to protect us against the French! 
Hacker: The French?!!  But they're our allies! 
Appleby: Well, they might be now; but they were our mortal enemies for 
  centuries, and old leopards don't change their spots. 
 
France has no friends, only interests.  Charles de Gaulle  
 
We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests 
are eternal and perpetual . . .   Lord Palmerston 
 
Background:  On November 2, 2010, UK Prime Minister David Cameron and 
French President Nicolas Sarkozy signed the Anglo-French Defence Co-
Operation Treaty.  It is comprised of an overarching treaty on defence 
cooperation as well as a subordinate treaty related to joint nuclear facilities.  
The Letter of Intent signed by the Defence Ministers and Chiefs of Defence 
Staff of both countries noted increasing interoperability between the armed 
forces of the UK and France as a major goal, as well as a number of separate 
joint initiatives. 
 
As noted by the UK Ministry of Defence at the signing of the Treaty, the 
measures agreed between the UK and France included work in the following 
areas: jointly developing a Combined Joint Expeditionary Force as a non-
standing bilateral capability; developing the ability to deploy a UK-French 
integrated carrier strike group incorporating assets owned by both countries 
(building primarily on maritime task group cooperation centered on the French 
carrier Charles de Gaulle); developing joint military doctrine and training 
programmes; extending bilateral cooperation on the acquisition of equipment 
and technologies; aligning (wherever possible) logistics arrangements; 
developing a stronger defence industrial and technology base, and enhancing 
joint working to defend against emerging security concerns such as cyber 
security.  Overall, the MOD noted that the Treaty is intended to enable the 
strengthening of operational linkages between the UK and French Armed 
Forces, sharing and pooling of materials and equipment, building of joint 
facilities, mutual access to defence markets, and increased industrial and 
technological cooperation (Ministry of Defence, 2010). 
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It would be fair to say that previous attempts at Anglo-French cooperation, 
most recently the St. Malo declaration of December 1998, did not achieve the 
level of bilateral cooperation that was initially anticipated by many observers, 
or indeed London and Paris.  Nor, as will be discussed later, did St. Malo 
serve as the foundation for a larger European effort to generate defence 
capabilities, as had been anticipated by then-Prime Minister Tony Blair.    
 
In the case of the 2010 treaty, it is apparent that pressures on both countries' 
military budgets have driven a shift in policy toward greater bilateral 
cooperation, particularly in the area of defence acquisition.  Subsequently, the 
2011 cooperation between London and Paris on military operations in Libya 
provided further indication of the benefits of greater bilateral coordination in 
the security area.  On the other hand, the political dispute at the end of 2011 
regarding the reluctance of the UK to fully support Franco-German proposals 
to save the Euro led to concerns that a weakened overall Anglo-French 
political relationship would have an impact on future defence cooperation.  
However, the outcome of the February 2012 Anglo-French Summit indicates 
that, despite the clash over the Euro, there appears to be continued 
determination to proceed with strengthened bilateral military cooperation.   
 
This paper seeks to assess, from a predominantly UK perspective, the 
potential implications for the U.S. of such enhanced Anglo-French defence 
cooperation, recognising that future problems in non-defence areas could put 
a brake on such efforts.  The paper will mainly focus on defence cooperation 
and not the subordinate agreement regarding limited cooperation on nuclear 
weapons, although a brief examination of that document is necessary.  The 
agreement addresses cooperation on the safety and security of nuclear 
weapons, stockpile certification and countering nuclear and radiological 
terrorism.  The immediate focus is the construction of joint radiographic-
hydrodynamic facilities (Harries, 2012, p. 13) and the initiatives were possible 
due to "long-term strategic shifts" (p. 21), but appear to be driven by "acute 
financial pressures, symptomatic of severe structural deficiencies" (p. 15). 
 
Past Successes and Failures:  As noted by Jones (2011, p. 12), enhanced 
defence cooperation between the UK and France would appear to be a 
natural fit.  In 2010, the UK defence budget was around €43.4bn (£36.4 bn)1  
and the French budget around €39.2 bn2.  Defence spending was between 
3.5 – 5% of total government spending in both countries.  The two combined 
defence budgets were just under half of all European defence spending 
(€82.6bn compared to €193.5bn) and accounted for around 75% of research 
and development spending (€6.48bn compared to €8.56bn). (Pires, 2012)  
Jones added that RAND has estimated that by 2015, combined UK and 
French defence budgets could be around 65% of EU defence spending (p. 
12).  
 
                                                 
1
 On February 29, 2012, £1 equalled $1.59 or 1.194 Euros. 
2
 On February 29, 2012, 1 Euro equalled $1.33 
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There has been a long-standing record of Anglo-French defence coordination.  
The two established a High-Level Working Group in 2006 to promote closer 
cooperation in armaments programmes.  They had already established a 
Franco-British European Air Group (1994), completed a Letter of Intent on 
naval cooperation (1996), as well as a Letter of Intent on cooperation between 
the two armies (1997) and established a Joint Commission on Peacekeeping 
(1996) to harmonise peacekeeping procedures and doctrine.  
 
On the other hand, the history of Anglo-French defence acquisition 
cooperation has been spotty.  There were successful programs in the 1960s 
and 1970s (including the Puma and Gazelle helicopters and the Jaguar strike 
aircraft) and the establishment of MBDA, Europe's leading manufacturer of 
guided weapons, in 2001, is a significant Anglo-French creation.  However, 
there have been notable failures.  For example, the UK dropped out of the 
agreement with France and Germany for production of the Trigat anti-tank 
missile and the Trimilsatcom communications satellite programme.  It also 
dropped out of the Horizon Common New Generation Frigate project which 
included France and Italy. (Antill, 2011)  
 
Continued Commitment:  At the February 17, 2012 UK-France Summit, the 
two leaders reemphasized their commitment to do more in the area of 
defence cooperation.  They noted that the 2010 agreement has led to 
expansion of cooperation "in every major field: capabilities, industry, 
operations and intelligence" (para 2).  After analyzing the Libya operation, the 
two countries "have decided to prioritise our joint work in the key areas of: 
command and control; information systems; intelligence, surveillance, 
targeting and reconnaissance; and precision munitions" (para 7).  They also 
noted that the Libya experience reinforced the desire to set up the Combined 
Joint Expeditionary Force (para 9) and the two nations will establish a 
Combined Joint Forces Headquarters by 2016 (para 14). 
 
It was notable that the most concrete results cited by the two leaders were in 
specific areas of defence equipment.  The desire for cooperation on 
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) was made manifest with specific projects.  
With regard to the Medium Altitude Long Endurance (MALE) drone, the two 
leaders announced they would soon "place with BAE Systems and Dassault a 
jointly funded contract to study the technical risks associated with the MALE 
UAV" (para 16).  France also confirmed its "interest for the (British) 
Watchkeeper system" with an evaluation by France to begin this year. 
(Chuter, 2012) 
 
There was also a reaffirmation of the pledge "to undertake in 2013 a joint 
Future Combat Air System Demonstration Programme that will set up a co-
operation of strategic importance for the future of the European Combat Air 
Sector."  The document highlighted the contract let to MBDA in December 
2011 for two initial studies on a future cruise and an anti-ship weapon (para 
23).  And it noted the intention to sign a contract in coming months for 
development and manufacture of the Future Anti-ship Guided Weapon.   
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Rationale - Policy Concurrence:  To determine what the Anglo-French 
Treaty may mean for the U.S., it is important to assess the driving forces 
behind this renewed effort at Anglo-French defence cooperation.  The 
question, as formulated by Lindley-French (2010, p. 20), is whether the Anglo-
French Treaty is "a new departure or simply the latest twist in the centuries-
old Anglo-French tussle for power?  It is probably a bit of both."  As he adds, 
"if Britain and France are to remain European powers with global reach they 
will need to share a vision of the big picture and stick to it" (p. 20).  Put even 
more bluntly, but in terms that will probably resonate in Washington 
 
Defence cooperation between Britain and France is and must always 
be about power.  The alternative is the decline of both countries, along 
with the rest of a Europe that seems to accept weakness as strength, 
equating an inability to act as meaning no need to act in the hope that 
danger simply bypasses a continent too weak to matter any longer (p. 
20). 
 
James Arbuthnot, the Chairman of the UK House of Commons Defence 
Select Committee, provided a similarly frank assessment in providing an 
overarching view of Anglo-French cooperation.  Arbuthnot stated that the 
opportunity to cooperate with France is one which the UK cannot pass up.  
Certainly, he added, there are suspicions between the UK and France.  The 
UK is always suspicious of what France can do or wishes to do.  But 
Arbuthnot suggested that it may be best to view the UK and France like two 
brothers: while they quarrel, what unites them is more than what divides them.   
 
General Sir Kevin O'Donoghue, Chief of Defence Materiel at the UK Ministry 
of Defence until 2011, concurred that the UK and France have roughly the 
same capabilities and policy views.  Bilateral cooperation is clearly logical for 
the UK.  And assessing the agreement from the French perspective, he 
believed that it makes sense for Paris to collaborate with London. 
 
Rationale - Shortage of Money:  The impact of budget cuts for the UK and 
France in spurring a desire for defence cooperation cannot be overstated.  
Arbuthnot conceded that scarce resources are a key driving force for 
increased cooperation.  But referring back to the earlier point on policy, he 
emphasized that there are also shared threats and responses which makes 
Anglo-French defence cooperation easier to develop. 
 
Indeed, the argument has been made that the focus of the bilateral effort is 
not even to preserve defence capabilities, but "it is apparent that the strong 
aspiration will be to achieve a specific quantum of savings" (Stevens, 2011, p. 
6).  In the UK, the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) mandated 
a cut of around 8% in UK defence spending in real terms over four years.  
(HM Government, 2010; IISS, 2010a) As a result, Bickerton (2010, p. 121) 
comments that "there is a chance that the budgetary crisis in the UK will push 
the government to recognise that potential savings can be made to the 
defence budget by cooperating more closely with France on armaments." 
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With regard to France, one writer notes that "a senior French military officer 
believes that the defence cuts in France in future are likely to be 
'unprecedented' with 'big decisions' on major programmes necessary" (Jones, 
2011, p. 16).  Stevens (p. 3) agrees that France is facing the same problem, 
noting that Defence Minister Morin announced a reduction of 3% out of the 
defence budget, which cut across a range of capabilities.  Perhaps more 
important, Stevens adds that there is speculation that even without a change 
of government, there could be a further 4-5% reduction (p. 3).  Such tight 
budgets necessitate a focus on how best to generate military capability from 
scarce resources.  Bickerton (p. 115) notes that "the French Government has 
also been interested above all in capabilities and force effectiveness."  
 
However, some analysts warn against placing too much emphasis on funding 
problems as the motivator behind the Anglo-French Treaty, arguing that there 
are more fundamental issues involved.  Jones argues that "it would be wrong 
to see Franco-British defence cooperation as driven purely by a short-term 
need to balance the books" (p. 7), outlining three long-term trends that 
challenge traditional thinking in London and Paris.  First, "defence budgets 
have not been funded to compensate for the rising cost of military capability."  
Second, the security environment makes it "all but impossible to make the 
political case for more defence spending."  Finally, "flat or lower spending 
combined with increasingly expensive technology undermines the viability of 
national, and even multinational, industries."  Jones asserts that these factors 
threaten British and French national defence industrial capabilities and 
potentially, operational autonomy (p. 7).     
 
If the Anglo-French treaty is indeed driven purely by immediate budgetary 
considerations, this raises questions regarding the long term prospects of this 
partnership.  As noted by Gomis (2011) 
 
The Franco-British treaties, although signed for a 50-year period, focus 
on the short-term need for capabilities.  A number of crucial questions 
therefore remain.  What will happen when the British and French 
economies recover?  Will the two countries' strategic differences re-
emerge?  Will they return to old habits of more protectionism and 
nationalism in the defence realm?  Will both governments gradually 
abandon the increased financial imperative in defence spending 
recently induced by budgetary austerity?  (p. 18) 
 
As a partial response, Jones (2011) cites the overarching political, military and 
industrial considerations which are critical to London and Paris, commenting  
 
For now, Franco-British defence cooperation is driven primarily by an 
aspiration in both countries to retain access to a full spectrum of 
military capabilities, sufficient to contribute strategic effect and retain 
credibility in the eyes of the United States, and therefore NATO.  A 
secondary motive is to sustain their national defence capabilities for 
core sovereign obligations.  A third is to contribute to bilateral and 
European missions, as well as to sustain general European military 
capabilities for an uncertain future (p. 21). 
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Rationale - Practical Defence Cooperation:  It also can be argued that the 
intentions behind this latest Anglo-French effort are quite practical, and are 
focused on the need to simply maintain credible military capabilities.  Jones 
states that the motivation  
 
is to maintain French and British aspirations to power projection and to 
military credibility in the eyes of the United States.  The many 
similarities and shared vital interests of France and the UK underpin, 
but do not drive, the initiative.  The end-goal is to retain access to 
military capability, whether that is through mutual dependence on each 
other's industrial base and armed forces, or through pooling and 
sharing capability (p. 5). 
 
Reinforcing the point that there are practical aspects to the cooperation, 
Jones asserts that while London and Paris want to be seen as credible 
partners by Washington, national sovereignty is also a key consideration.  The 
UK and France are driven by the motivation of retaining access "to a full range 
of capabilities to pursue independent foreign policies" (p. 8). 
 
Echoing the point of practical areas for developing capabilities, one UK official 
commented that there is potential with regard to better Anglo-French 
cooperation in areas such as joint support and training.  There could be more 
use of simulators, for example, as well as opportunities for sharing facilities.  
With regard to practical examples of defence cooperation, the International 
Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS, 2010b) notes that the UK and France 
have an agreement to develop a common support plan for the A-400M 
transport and there is discussion of an arrangement whereby France could 
use some of the extra capacity in the UK Future Strategic Tanker Aircraft.   
 
Political Leadership is Key:  There appears to be widespread agreement 
that political leadership in London and Paris is essential to making bilateral 
cooperation work.  That certainly was the case in previous agreements, such 
as St. Malo, which also highlighted the significance of the rationale (at least 
from the UK perspective) behind pursuing greater Anglo-French defence 
cooperation.  With regard to St. Malo, Bickerton (2010, p. 120) notes that "the 
wars in Yugoslavia and rising tensions in Kosovo had pushed Tony Blair 
towards a Franco-British defence agreement in order to enhance the EU's 
capabilities for intervention."  Shearer (2000, p. 288) concurs that the Bosnia 
crisis was a "major challenge to Britain's defence identity" and strengthened 
"Britain's sense of belonging to a European political community."  Later, the 
Kosovo crisis was a key factor for Blair as it made apparent "Europe's relative 
military impotence" (Shearer, 2000, p. 293).     
 
The St. Malo example highlights two issues.  The first issue is whether Anglo-
French defence cooperation can survive if bilateral relations are strained over 
other issues.  As noted by one writer, the St. Malo spirit was dashed by the 
sharp policy divisions regarding Iraq and reflected the divergent political views 
in London and Paris (Howorth, 2003, p. 188).  The results of the initial test for 
the 2010 agreement would seem to provide grounds for optimism.  Even after 
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the critical dispute over the package to support the Euro, the results of the 
2012 Anglo-French Summit were quite positive. 
 
The second issue is the extent to which this bilateral push is a creation of the 
political leadership.  For if that is indeed the case, that raises the two 
questions of 1) whether bilateral cooperation has become embedded as 
"business as usual" in the two bureaucracies and 2) whether it can survive a 
change in leadership.  The mixed views on the first question are provided 
later.  On the second question, this leads, from the UK perspective, to the 
immediate question of the extent to which French enthusiasm will continue if 
Sarkozy does not stay on as President.  Writing about the French return to the 
NATO integrated military command, Bickerton notes that from the UK 
perspective, there is a question whether the French attitude regarding the 
U.S. and NATO "goes much further than the President himself and much will 
depend on whether or not Sarkozy is able to win a second term" (p. 117) 
 
Addressing these issues, Arbuthnot stressed that the high-level political push 
on Anglo-French cooperation is essential, particularly with regard to bilateral 
commercial success.  At summits, there is a drive to get deliverables and 
action.  That has a direct impact on efforts which lead to industry taking 
concrete steps.  That would certainly appear to be apparent in the various 
defence industrial initiatives announced in 2012.   
 
Arbuthnot conceded that the difficulties regarding the Euro could well remain 
a critical factor, which leads to questions regarding the personal relationship 
between Cameron and Sarkozy., He emphasized however, that the press 
always seizes on personal relationships as the decisive factor, while he 
believes the drive for bilateral cooperation goes deeper than that.  Arbuthnot 
noted that when he and the Deputy Chair of the Defence Select Committee 
went to Paris soon after the dispute on the Euro, UK and French officials were 
very clearly determined to ensure that bilateral defence cooperation would 
continue. 
 
On the question of the level of support for bilateral cooperation below the 
political leadership, O'Donoghue commented that there are lots of challenges 
and mistrust which must be overcome.  He asserted that the MOD leadership 
has bought into Anglo-French cooperation.  But with regard to farther down in 
the UK bureaucracies, the level of support is mixed, as some individuals are 
pro-U.S. and some are pro-Europe.  O'Donoghue stressed that the point is 
that these are not mutually exclusive, but acknowledged that these differing 
views exist. 
 
Taking a different perspective on the issue, a UK official noted that Anglo-
French defence cooperation will work as well as the politicians want it to work.  
He cited as a good example, the establishment of OCCAR (Organisation 
Conjointe de Cooperation en matiere d'Armement), which was set up to 
handle the through-life management of collaborative European defence 
equipment programmes.  OCCAR has six European members, including the 
UK and France.  The UK official noted that there was a big political push to 
establish OCCAR and a lot of support at that time.  The intention was to 
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change European defence acquisition, and steps were taken quickly to 
achieve that goal.  It had impressive results, and a treaty was concluded.   
 
But then, noted the UK official, the politicians walked away and left it to the 
bureaucrats to manage and in the absence of political leadership, the result 
was an ethos of 'not' making decisions.  Each country wanted to make things 
work in its own way while no-one was there "to bang heads together."  The 
UK official commented that this would apply to any effort, and the key is 
whether there is real political support in London and Paris to make Anglo-
French defence cooperation work.   
 
And in the view of this UK official, this is still an open question.  This could still 
be a case of just good words, and not following up.  Below the political level, 
there is a lot of scepticism in the UK MOD and UK defence industry about big 
ticket items, especially due to doubts about whether the Anglo-French 
initiative will be enduring.  In addition, he reiterated the point that defence 
cooperation is subject to developments in non-defence areas, such as the 
Euro and elections. 
 
On that count, Jones notes that "if bureaucratic and industrial obstacles can 
be overcome, there is a clear path to substantial cost savings and 
interoperability gains" (p. 35).  However, he appears to agree with 
O'Donoghue and the UK official that there is a risk that the Anglo-French effort 
could founder due to simple bureaucratic inertia. 
 
Ministries of Defence in both London and Paris have highly effective 
'immune systems', notorious for rejecting new ideas.  It can be 
challenging enough to embed change within the confines of a single 
department, never mind across different departments in two different 
countries.  It is only natural that such a process will meet resistance 
from those who will tend to protect their functions and be cautious of 
different ways of working (p. 33). 
 
Impact of Libya:  It is apparent that the Anglo-French efforts in the military 
operation regarding Libya have been a shot in the arm for bilateral defence 
cooperation.  Nick Harvey, UK Minister for the Armed Forces, told a UK 
Parliamentary Committee that Anglo-French cooperation on Libya was 
"undoubtedly ... a significant success" (IISS, 2011a).  He went on to note that 
"we are pleased to have demonstrated the ability of the UK and France to act 
together in a leading role in the way that we have, which is encouraging for 
the future."   
 
Certainly, there were positive aspects of the Libya experience.  For example, 
there was solid UK-French air and maritime cooperation.  However, 
commentators noted that the Libya campaign exposed the problems which 
remain in bilateral military cooperation.  There were difficulties in 
communications, different concepts of operation, gaps in intelligence sharing 
and a problem with aligning political ambition and military capabilities.  
Perhaps most important were the problems in sharing classified information.  
Whether that particular issue can be resolved can come down to the question 
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of whether the UK can expand its exchanges with Paris while not risking its 
arrangements with Washington (IISS, 2011a).  Jones notes that there are 
agreements in place between the UK and France to share intelligence, but 
they are "lower-key" (p. 13) and Lindley-French noted that "enhanced 
intelligence-sharing will be critical" to enhanced bilateral cooperation, and was 
noticeable by its absence in the 2010 agreement (p. 16). 
 
Taking a larger perspective on the lessons from the Libya experience, 
Arbuthnot noted that the U.S. took a positive step by giving Europeans the 
opportunity to take the lead.  Ultimately, the U.S. provided assistance when 
that became necessary to address European shortfalls.  But the Libya 
operation, stressed Arbuthnot, reminded Europeans of their obligations, 
highlighted the gaps in their military capabilities, and subsequently allowed 
the U.S. to press Europe to fill those gaps. 
 
Practical Impediments:  The commentary on weaknesses in intelligence 
sharing during Libya operations highlights some of the practical difficulties 
with enhancing defence cooperation.  For example, there continue to be 
comments about the extent to which the UK and France might be able to work 
together with regard to their aircraft carriers.  One area cited by the 2010 
agreement is development of an integrated carrier strike group.  The UK 
decided in its SDSR that it would continue with the construction of two 
carriers, but potentially only bring one into service.  Some commentators have 
noted that the UK decision to get the F-35C carrier version of the Joint Strike 
Fighter might allow the UK's F-35Cs to land on the French Charles de Gaulle 
(IISS, 2010a).   
 
Assessing such an idea, O'Donoghue asked what kind of Anglo-French 
cooperation on aircraft carriers was really possible.  He asked as a practical 
matter whether there is enough room on the carriers for combined crews.   
O'Donoghue noted that when he saw how the U.S. carrier George 
Washington operated, it appeared to be chaos, but it worked due to years of 
training.  With any combination of Anglo-French planes and carriers, there 
would be the same kind of chaos, but without the years of training.  A French 
carrier alongside a UK carrier would be a separate issue, added O'Donoghue.  
But he questioned whether it is really realistic to try to fly two different types of 
aircraft off of one carrier. 
 
Continuing on with the issue of practical impediments and addressing it at a 
higher level, O'Donoghue noted that the French budget and financial system 
is different from the UK.  While the larger goal may be to come together, the 
two processes are different, and that has an impact.  The key, stressed 
O'Donoghue, is to find the common ground that allows possible solutions and 
cooperation to go forward. 
 
Multinational Defence Cooperation in General:  Before turning from the 
area of practical defence cooperation to defence industrial cooperation, it is 
worthwhile to assess the general UK experience with regard to multinational 
defence industrial cooperation.  In general, the UK record on multinational 
defence acquisition has been beneficial to the UK. 
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National Audit Office (NAO), cited by a UK official as still the best assessment 
on benefits to the UK of multinational defence cooperation, noted that 
 
Cooperation in defence research offers economic and technology 
benefits, generating a 5:1 return on the Department's £40 million 
annual investment on joint research programmes and providing 
knowledge with an annual value of approximately £280 million at 
minimal cost through information exchange programmes. (p. 1)  
 
In general terms, the NAO assessed that cooperative defence acquisition can 
bring economic benefits due to cost-sharing and economies of scale.  
Moreover, it can enhance interoperability with Allies as well as develop 
technological competence and influence industrial restructuring (p. 1).  With 
regard to OCCAR, the NAO noted that it offers "the opportunity for significant 
improvements in the efficiency and effectiveness of European cooperative 
procurement" (p. 35).  It commented that OCCAR was intended to serve as 
the body that would place contracts, manage cooperative European 
acquisition programs and generate European cooperative military 
programmes.   
 
However, it is notable that the overall conclusions by the NAO on 
multinational defence cooperation are that  
 
Cooperation adds another layer of complexity to the challenge of 
procuring equipments within time, cost and performance parameters 
and subsequently supporting them in-service.  The track record of 
defence equipment cooperation to date has been mixed.  Whilst there 
have been economic, political, military and industrial benefits, on 
significant numbers of cooperative procurement programmes, not all of 
the potential benefits have been secured (p. 5). 
   
Industrial Cooperation is Key:  As noted previously, the 2012 Summit 
declaration placed great emphasis on bilateral defence industrial cooperation 
and the case can be made that industrial cooperation may, over the long haul, 
be more valuable than practical military cooperation.  For that reason, it is 
notable that "the treaties have been warmly received by the defence 
industries of both countries" (Gomis, p. 16).   
 
One of the goals of expanded bilateral cooperation was to provide some 
support for defence industries in both countries which are facing reduced 
defence spending.  As noted by some commentators, "by moving closer to 
commonly set equipment requirements, the treaty was intended to promote 
stepped-up cross-channel industrial ties between the two nations' defence-
aerospace sectors" (IISS, 2011a). 
 
At the lower level, noted a UK official, there have been successful bilateral 
projects.  However, they do not get much attention, citing marine engines as a 
good example.  They are not high-profile items, but they are built on an 
existing relationship and there is a solid commercial basis for the work.  
Cooperation works, emphasized the official, but because of that commercial 
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logic.  Critically, this removes the bureaucracy as a hindrance.  Citing another 
example, the UK official asserted that MBDA is a good and more prominent 
example of a result of Anglo-French political commitment.   
 
The question arises whether Anglo-French industrial cooperation actually is 
possible across the board, or might have to be limited to smaller, non-
controversial areas such as marine engines and if it has broader applicability, 
how would the UK and France establish "red lines" to protect national 
interests?  Is it a case of deciding the items which are appropriate for 
cooperation?  Or is it a case of establishing processes to limit activities, such 
as information sharing?  O'Donoghue came down strongly in favour of 
deciding the specific items, emphasizing that "if you select the right 
equipment, there are no red lines.  If there are red lines, you have pushed the 
wrong equipment." 
 
Impediments to Industrial Cooperation:  But if the critical long-term aspect 
of Anglo-French cooperation is on defence procurement, there are numerous 
obstacles noted by commentators.  One wrote soon after St. Malo that 
 
sensible defence procurement between Britain and France means that 
those two proud and sometimes arrogant nations have to concede 
political, technical and manufacturing grounds to one another and 
accept some form of loss of independence, concessions on foreign 
policy, intrusions in the shaping of industry, and last but not least the 
inevitable jobs casualties, a price that fewer and fewer politicians are 
prepared to pay (Carre, 2001, p. 6). 
 
There are clear differences in views on defence procurement.  France has 
"traditionally retained a protectionist attitude towards its defence sector, which 
is in large part owned by the state, in line with the country's tradition of 
Colbertian economic policies in which the central government retains a central 
role" (Gomis, p. 17).  The UK approach has been to allow for the defence 
market to be free.  Moreover, while France's industrial relations "are more 
oriented towards Europe" UK industries retain strong ties with the U.S. market 
(Gomis, p. 17). 
 
As noted by Carre, UK defence procurement is "a clear means to a clear end - 
that is to equip the defence forces" (p. 7).  On the other hand, Carre notes the 
French policy aim is  
 
being pro-active in contributing to the building of a European defence 
base with a strong French footprint.  This is mainly to be able to 
compete and/or establish partnerships with U.S. companies, on an 
equal foothold.  The means to achieve this goal remains a direct 
interventionist policy, enforced by an elite administration.  Thus, French 
defence procurement has been and remains an element to achieve this 
ultimate political goal of creating a European defence force equipped 
with, at worst, inter-operable systems and, at best, the same 
weapons... In such an environment, economic rationale, efficiency and 
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defence companies' profits have been, for some years, the least of the 
concerns for the French State (p. 7). 
 
Moreover, there are fundamental conflicts between the behaviours of the two 
countries regarding defence acquisition.  A UK official noted that there are 
differences in the way the two countries approach efforts at defence 
cooperation.  The UK declares its intention for cooperation early.  In contrast, 
the French declare it late when they frankly have a solution they want others 
to buy into.   
 
There are many practical hurdles to be overcome in obtaining greater defence 
industrial cooperation.  Lindley-French noted that then-UK Defence Secretary 
Fox highlighted the need for UK firms to have better access to French military 
procurement projects (p. 17).  For their part, the French "regard the British as 
unreliable partners, too subject to political whim and the sudden cancellation 
of or adjustment to programmes" (p. 17).  Having said that, Lindley-French 
reinforces the point that  
 
even a cursory analysis of the defence economics and costs of 
production in Britain and France suggests that it is only through greater 
synergy between their defence industries that any MoDicum of 
affordability and security of supply and re-supply will be assured.  (p. 
17)   
 
Arbuthnot concurred with many of the points noted above.  France has a 
directed industrial strategy, and the French government owns a good chunk of 
French defence industry.  The UK does not have that kind of ownership 
pattern, and the UK defence market is open.  But Arbuthnot emphasized that 
these are not insurmountable obstacles, and the value of the bilateral defence 
cooperation should be considerable and can overcome those obstacles, 
stressing that there is a fundamental logic for Anglo-French cooperation.   
 
Taking a different perspective, O'Donoghue commented that industry has to 
change, and the MODs in London and Paris need to work to smooth the path.  
He noted that government cannot change the goals of industry, but it can 
influence how industry's goals evolve.  For example, the UK does not 
necessarily want the ability to cut steel for future armoured vehicles.  What it 
needs is the ability to integrate complex systems and sub-systems.  If that is a 
clear government policy, industry will then change its perspective.   
 
O'Donoghue also noted that this is even more important regarding larger 
policy issues.  If the UK gives up a logistical capability, it cannot get it back, so 
the UK has to be clear about what it wants to do.  Industry faces a similar 
situation.  O'Donoghue stressed that a big request is being made of the UK 
defence industry.  Will it get rid of 50% of its engineers?  Will it actually rely on 
the French over the long haul?   
 
Returning to the importance of leadership, a UK official emphasized that big 
political statements and commitments are critical to make better Anglo-French 
commercial relationships.  If the political commitment is weakened, there can 
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be work on minor, lower-level items, but the big ticket projects will not happen 
and this is precisely the area where Europe has expertise, perhaps even a 
comparative advantage and needs to focus its attention. 
 
Cutting Edge Defence Technology:  The 2012 Summit declaration had a 
particular focus on Anglo-French high-tech defence cooperation.  One of the 
areas in which there is particular emphasis is UAVs.  On MALE UAVs, 
commentators have noted there is a business logic to the arrangement, as 
BAE Systems and Dassault have capabilities in the area, and their domestic 
markets would only generate a market of some 40-50 MALE UAVs (IISS, 
2010b).  Indeed, should MALE work, there is the possibility of more 
collaboration on unmanned combat air vehicles, and such work would 
probably be important to maintaining the skills of European industry (IISS, 
2011a).  Returning to the practical considerations noted above, what will be 
interesting to observe is whether this cooperation will be possible in light of 
competition in other areas, for example, after India selected the Rafale from 
Dassault over the Eurofighter from BAE Systems as its preferred choice for its 
new fighter in late 2011.   
 
Certainly, the argument could be made that the French approach to long-term 
planning with regard to defence technology could be appealing to the UK.  As 
Carre notes, the French MOD has upwards of a 30-year prospective plan 
which is updated annually (p. 9).  In the case of the UK, the government 
reconfirmed through its White Paper "National Security Through Technology" 
(MoD, 2012, p. 9) that it would maintain its baseline of spending 1.2% of its 
defence budget on science and technology (around £400 million annually).   
 
In addition, Lindley-French highlights the agreement concerning a 10-year 
strategic plan for the UK and French Complex Weapons sector, commenting 
that it "makes sense if it does lead to the creation of a single European prime 
contractor (and realizes 30% savings as envisaged)" (p. 17).  A UK official 
noted that the UAV area is one in which France is trying to bring the UK into a 
joint venture and where there is potentially substantial growth.  But harkening 
back to the point noted above, the broader cost to the UK has to be 
considered and a clear policy decision must be made. 
 
Arbuthnot asserted that work in this high-tech area is important in a broader 
Western context.  Large U.S. firms clearly have an advantage over European 
companies.  But high-quality defence research is broadly needed and that 
cannot be obtained just with small UK and French firms.  Thus, there is logic 
to UK-French cooperation in this expensive, high-tech area.  However, he 
conceded, while there are benefits of scale, there is also a natural suspicion.  
There is a mutual concern in France and the UK that the other is stealing 
intellectual property.  Those suspicions have to be overcome by openness, 
noted Arbuthnot and both a top-down and bottom-up approach for further 
bilateral cooperation is needed to spur progress and generate that 
transparency.  In that regard, Libya served as practical experience to increase 
that level of trust and obtain more openness by both sides. 
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O'Donoghue commented that three years ago, it was clear to officials in the 
UK and France that more industrial cooperation, in general, would be mutually 
beneficial.  Citing complex weapons specifically, he said there are clear 
options, and it is far too expensive for each country to work in this area 
separately.  True, he noted, the UK could simply have bought high-tech U.S. 
equipment.  But the other option was to have an arrangement between Paris 
and London with each spending as much as possible to generate an Anglo-
French complex weapons capability. 
 
It took a long time for defence industries in the UK and France to recognise 
the benefits of such collaboration, admitted O'Donoghue.  He concurred with 
the point made by Arbuthnot about obstacles due to attitudes and behaviours.  
But he asserted that a lot of the problem may have been due to media hype 
about potential conflicts.  Addressing practical problems, O'Donoghue cited 
intellectual property rights and third party sales, commenting that London and 
Paris have to generate arrangements to smooth obstacles in these and other 
areas for industry.   
 
Perhaps most important, up to this point, noted O'Donoghue, industry has not 
put its weight behind Anglo-French cooperation.  It will be interesting to see if 
they are ready to do so from now on.  In short, asserted O'Donoghue, it is not 
clear if industry has "crossed the Rubicon" and is ready to embrace bilateral 
cooperation, but in his view, they certainly need to do so.  Industry, he 
asserted flatly, has to get that message. 
 
Reaction of Other Europeans:  The Anglo-French agreement has not been 
met with universal approval, especially as it involves the two largest defence 
budgets in Europe seeking to cooperate more with each other, rather than 
working to develop European capabilities.  Gomis (p. 14) notes that "reactions 
in Berlin have demonstrated Germany's unease over an exclusive Franco-
British agreement."  A UK official agreed that Anglo-French cooperation has 
generated tensions within the rest of Europe.  Italy and others are "incensed."  
But he added that the question to be asked of the other Europeans is simple: 
who has the money?     
 
Consideration has now turned to the question of whether the bilateral efforts 
could potentially provide an impetus to a larger European effort to generate 
defence capabilities.  One writer commented that "given the difficulties 
encountered in defence procurement in the past decade, the Franco-British 
treaties can nonetheless be seen as a first salutary step towards more joint 
action in European defence procurement" (Gomis, p. 17).  Lindley-French 
argues that  
 
Anglo-French defence cooperation would be a pioneer group par 
excellence for the rest of Europe.  Thus permanent structured 
cooperation and reinforced cooperation, as stipulated in the 2009 
Lisbon Treaty, would assist Britain and France to create a European 
strategic culture worthy of the name (p. 14). 
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One commentator noted that "the enhancement of Franco-British common 
efforts will benefit the EU by stemming the deterioration of British and French 
military capabilities, on which EU deployments rely" (O'Donnell, p. 428).  The 
effort has significance as London is "particularly exasperated by its European 
partners inertia; but even in Paris frustrations are mounting" regarding the 
absence of effort in the rest of Europe to maintain defence capabilities 
(O'Donnell, p. 428).  
 
Arriving at a similar destination through a different route, Jones asserts that 
the primary motivation for the Anglo-French initiative is "not to produce a 
greater or more effective 'European 'military capability" (p. 5).  He notes that it 
could possibly "cause divisions among European states if the Franco-British 
relationship is seen as too exclusive and not sufficiently concerned with wider 
European security" (p. 5).  However, Jones also notes that Anglo-French 
cooperation could indeed be "a road-map to more effective European defence 
cooperation, based on deeper capability planning and mutual dependency" (p. 
5).  Indeed, taking the point further, he notes that unless Europe ascertains 
"how, and, indeed, whether, the initiatives that France and the UK embark on 
can work in practice, wider European defence cooperation has little hope of 
delivering anything" (pp. 5-6).   
 
It is notable that there is speculation that the request for proposals for the 
MALE UAV could be open to other European (as well as possibly U.S) firms 
(IISS, 2011a) and there is the possibility that broader cooperation could be 
expanded.  However, other commentators note that the UK has been burned 
by multinational European projects like the A-400M and will not be 
enthusiastic about such expanded projects (IISS, 2011a). 
 
Indeed, it appears that the UK has had enough of projects involving a number 
of European partners.  A comment from the IISS (2011b) states "Having tired 
of the delays and haggling that often accompany multilateral European 
procurements, the UK now firmly prefers collaborative procurement on a 
bilateral basis."  Jones notes that there is "a pragmatic assumption that 
bilateralism between 'natural partners' ought to work more effectively than a 
multilateral approach" (p. 8).  He adds that the UK "now prefers bilateral 
programmes as a matter of policy, on the grounds that they are more 
'straightforward'" (p. 15).   
 
The trend of UK reluctance to participate in Europe-wide defence efforts, 
which had already begun under the previous Labour Government, has 
continued.  While there are many factors, it has been argued that the principal 
motivating force is  
 
the belief, widely held in government and military circles, that efforts in 
this direction are an inefficient use of Britain's limited resources -- a 
belief resulting from years of frustrations at the lack of serious 
commitment to defence on the part of many European countries  
(O'Donnell, p. 420). 
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Then-UK Defence Secretary Fox stated in September 2011 that the Anglo-
French arrangement will not be copied between the UK and other Europeans 
stating, "The UK-French agreement is not a prototype for wider European 
defence, but I do think it might be useful in setting an example to other 
European nations who want to work closely together" (Janes, 2011).  That 
view reflects the fact that the SDSR only specifically cited France (MOD, p. 
60) along with the U.S. as countries with which the UK would be working 
assiduously to strengthen bilateral efforts.   
 
In line with the points above, Arbuthnot commented that it is too early to say if 
there would be more European initiatives as a result of the Anglo-French 
agreement.  He thought that European efforts would probably expand a little 
as a result, but emphasized that the extent of the expansion depends on how 
others are willing to go along with the Anglo-French framework.  Arbuthnot 
firmly noted that it is definitely not desirable to have a new framework which 
destroys the UK-French arrangement. 
 
The main idea, stressed Arbuthnot, is to get the two big European countries to 
work together.  If bringing in others means the dilution of Anglo-French 
cooperation, this would not be acceptable.  Other European states should 
decide whether to join the existing arrangement.  As it stands, he noted, Italy 
is "cross" about Anglo-French cooperation, Spain is not happy, and Germany 
would like to be involved.  With regard to defence industrial cooperation, it 
must be based on an arrangement between the UK and France, or British and 
French firms, with other European states or firms then joining. 
 
O'Donoghue concurred strongly with Arbuthnot, stating that he dislikes 
multinational projects, but supports bilateral programs.  Mistakes in past 
efforts on joint cooperation could and should be fixed.  But with regard to 
future European efforts in defence cooperation, the Anglo-French path this is 
the one and only road that should be followed.           
 
It is important to note that other analysts who share that view believe this 
means the death of any European efforts to maintain a defence capability and 
acknowledgment that only bilateral efforts will work.  O'Donnell argues that the 
agreement "could come to symbolize the demise of EU defence efforts" as 
"the summit took place against the backdrop of a loss of interest in the CSDP 
within Paris and, to an even greater extent, London" (p. 433). 
 
It appears for that very reason to be in the interest of the U.S. that Anglo-
French defence cooperation proceed.  It is arguably the only way in which 
European defence capabilities can be maintained.  O'Donnell notes that "little 
demonstration is required of the hollowness of EU defence cooperation 
without the full support of Britain and France" (p. 428) and flatly states that  
 
EU defence efforts are doomed to flounder if there is no enthusiasm 
from the only two EU countries with extensive experience in 
expeditionary warfare and global ambitions in security, and which 
between them account for nearly half of Europe's defence spending (p. 
429). 
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U.S. Interest:  And therein lies the reason for the U.S. to support the Anglo-
French efforts and hope that they will succeed.  To return to the paper topic, 
the implications for the U.S. of Anglo-French cooperation are quite clear: they 
constitute the best hope of providing a vehicle or framework for European 
Allies to develop defence capabilities.  With European defence budgets 
having shrunk over the last decade and economic difficulties making it unlikely 
that there will be any major increases in the near future and an absence of 
political will to spend large sums on defence, one hope for the U.S. of getting 
more defence capabilities out of its European Allies is that others will join an 
effort driven by London and Paris. 
 
Commentators have noted that one of the key conditions for success for the 
Anglo-French treaty includes the "support of the United States, based on the 
understanding that the Franco-British treaties do not clash with its global role 
but will rather reinforce it" (Gomis, p. 4).  Gomis adds later that "Washington 
may be tempted to view this partnership as competition, but it is very unlikely 
to be the case" and asserts that "the Franco-British treaties are useful for 
European defence and should not be opposed" (p. 12).  Indeed, the argument 
is made that the U.S. "has a crucial role to play in making the case for the 
treaties and other examples of bilateral cooperation that would benefit both 
NATO and the EU" (p. 19). 
 
Indeed, PM Cameron emphasized the benefit of the treaty to U.S. interests 
when he stated that "they want European countries like France and Britain to 
come together and share defence resources so that we actually have greater 
capabilities (...) So I think this will get a very warm welcome in Washington" 
(Gomis, p. 11).  One commentator asserts that "it is generally recognized that 
Washington perceives the Anglo-French Defence Treaty as a potential 
catalyst for creating the greater cooperation on conventional capabilities in 
Europe" (Stevens, page 4).   
 
Those who are particularly critical about European capabilities focus on the 
possibilities in the Anglo-French treaty.  Lindley-French frankly notes that "the 
central challenge for both Britain and France is that much of the European 
continent remains on strategic vacation" (p. 9).  Continuing on, he argues that 
"at the very least, Anglo-French defence cooperation will need to regenerate a 
European strategic culture" (p. 9).  He also makes the point that the Anglo-
French Treaty "only makes political sense if it is seen as an attempt to kick-
start Europe as a whole into considering its strategic future; and that will 
require a degree of political solidarity and consistency for which neither 
London nor Paris are renowned" (p. 4).  He bluntly states that "Franco-British 
defence cooperation is thus not just vital for London and Paris but for a 
Europe that is dangerously and strategically adrift" (p. 5). 
 
Arbuthnot also asserted that the U.S. should encourage Anglo-French 
cooperation, noting that it is likely to maximise defence output for the UK and 
France, which would benefit the U.S.  And it could increase the defence 
output of other European countries if others are willing to sign on to the Anglo-
French framework.  Arbuthnot commented that his hope is that the U.S. will 
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welcome the idea that Allies are working together to increase military 
capabilities.  As for what concrete steps it should take with regard to Anglo-
French cooperation, Arbuthnot stated that the U.S. could simply take "a 
benign watching brief." 
 
O'Donoghue echoed the point that Anglo-French cooperation is not an 
either/or situation vis-a-vis the U.S.  If Europe "gets its act together," it would 
be better for the U.S.  Indeed, O'Donoghue said that his message to the U.S. 
would be that both the UK and France will both be better allies for the U.S. if 
they engaged in more robust defence cooperation.  Without collaboration, 
they will just lose capabilities and it will be harder to generate more efficient 
use of resources.   
 
He went on to posit that it may be better for the West to have different 
capabilities.  O'Donoghue stressed that the UK and France have superb 
engineers.  Indeed, some UK equipment and technology is better than that 
produced in the U.S.  And in some capability areas, noted O'Donoghue, 
"made in the U.S.A" is not necessarily the best label, and a European label 
might be better.  An Anglo-French military-industry capability, posited 
O'Donoghue, should be welcomed by the U.S.  Europe is not big enough to 
have national defence industrial competition.  But pan-European competition 
is possible.  An Anglo-French effort could compete on complex weapons, and 
other areas.  The U.S. government ought to welcome this cooperation as 
strengthening Allied capabilities, even if U.S. industry is not enthused. 
 
Conclusion:  From the literature, public statements, interviews, and, above 
all, actions, it is clear that the U.S. has little, if any, reason for concern 
regarding enhanced Anglo-French defence cooperation.  Any fears that this 
would signal a weakening of attention by the UK towards the U.S. appear 
groundless.  This latest initiative is driven by practical considerations: reduced 
defence budgets require London and Paris to find new ways to get more 
"bang for the buck."  There are policy factors which promote enhanced 
cooperation.  The French return to the NATO integrated military command 
and the policies generally pursued by the Sarkozy government have made it 
easier for London to seek greater bilateral efforts and it should be noted that 
the clearly stated U.S. shift in emphasis towards Asia has also prompted the 
UK to re-evaluate the extent to which it needs to focus more on European 
Allies which could really assist in generating defence capabilities. 
 
It would appear that the primary U.S. concern lies in how to ensure that the 
Anglo-French initiative succeeds.  If it does indeed meet the goals that have 
been set forth, it would assist London and Paris in becoming more capable 
Allies and moving beyond that goal, it would be in the interest of the U.S. if the 
Anglo-French cooperation could be the foundation for other European states 
to also participate and develop their military capabilities.  U.S. dissatisfaction 
with the overall European effort in the Libyan campaign was apparent across 
Europe.  However, there is no indication that European governments are 
ready to do more on defence, especially with continued economic problems in 
the Eurozone. 
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From a U.S. policy perspective, the recommendation from Arbuthnot is 
relatively straightforward and worth consideration: Washington should simply 
watch the developments.  It is hard to imagine active U.S. support for more 
Anglo-French cooperation, particularly as such work on the industrial side 
might generate negative commentary from U.S. defence industry.  Moreover, 
it is hard to imagine such U.S. support having much effect, particularly in view 
of the lack of response in European capitals to the constant U.S. requests for 
European Allies to do more in developing military capabilities.   
 
However, if the U.S. is genuinely concerned about the level of European 
military spending and, more important, the extent of the military capabilities 
that Allies can bring to any future operations, it has a vested interest in seeing 
Anglo-French cooperation succeed and serve as a vehicle for other 
Europeans to develop their military forces.  Criticism from Washington will 
have a difficult time overcoming the lack of political will and financial 
resources in European capitals for effective national action.  The Anglo-
French efforts may at least provide a vehicle for channeling scarce resources 
into more effective defence spending.  While that may yet turn out to be more 
of a hope than reality, it is certainly in line with U.S. defence and security 
policy interests, and worthy of support. 
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